1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	SHEPPARD MULLIN RICHTER & HAMPTON I A Limited Liability Partnership Including Professional Corporations GARY L. HALLING, Cal. Bar No. 66087 JAMES L. McGINNIS, Cal. Bar No. 95788 MICHAEL W. SCARBOROUGH, Cal. Bar No. 20 Four Embarcadero Center, 17 th Floor San Francisco, California 94111-4106 Telephone: 415-434-9100 Facsimile: 415-434-3947 E-mail: ghalling@sheppardmullin.com imcginnis@sheppardmullin.com imcginnis@sheppardmullin.com SAMSUNG SDI AMERICA, INC., SAMSUNG SDI (MALAYSIA) SDN. BHD., SAMSUNG SDI MEXICO S.A. DE C.V., SAMSUNG SDI BRASIL LTDA., SHENZHEN SAMSUNG SDI CO., LTD. and TIANJIN SAMSUNG SDI CO., LTD.	03524
12 13		
14	UNITED STATES D	ISTRICT COURT
15	NORTHERN DISTRIC	Γ OF CALIFORNIA
16 17	SAN FRANCISC	CO DIVISION
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26	In re: CATHODE RAY TUBE (CRT) ANTITRUST LITIGATION This Document Relates to: IN RE: APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE FOR THE ISSUANCE OF SUBPOENAS PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1782 TO OBTAIN DISCOVERY FOR USE IN A FOREIGN PROCEEDING Case No. CV-12-80-151 MISC	Case No. 07-5944 SC MDL No. 1917 DECLARATION OF MICHAEL W. SCARBOROUGH IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' AND SAVERI'S JOINT MOTION TO ADOPT SPECIAL MASTER'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION REGARDING SUBPOENA
28		

1	I, MICHAEL W. SCARBOROUGH, hereby declare:
2	1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of California and in the
3	United States District Court for the Northern District of California. I am a partner with the firm of
4	Sheppard, Mullin, Richter and Hampton LLP ("Sheppard Mullin"), counsel of record for
5	defendants Samsung SDI America, Inc., Samsung SDI Co., Ltd., Samsung SDI (Malaysia) Sdn.
6	Bhd., Samsung SDI Mexico S.A. de C.V., Samsung SDI Brasil Ltda., Shenzen Samsung SDI Co.,
7	Ltd., and Tianjin Samsung SDI Co., Ltd. in this matter. I make this declaration in support of
8	Defendants' and Saveri & Saveri, Inc. ("Saveri")'s Joint Motion to Adopt the Special Master's
9	October 22, 2012 Report and Recommendation to grant Defendants' Motion to Quash Sharp
10	Corporation's Subpoena Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782 and to deny Sharp Corporation's Motion to
11	Compel Saveri & Saveri, Inc. to Produce Certain Documents and Deposition Transcripts. If called
12	as a witness, I could, and would, testify to the matters set forth in this declaration of my own
13	personal knowledge.
14	2. The Special Master heard oral argument on September 20, 2012 regarding
15	Defendants' Motion to Quash Sharp Corporation's Subpoena Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782 and to
16	deny Sharp Corporation's Motion to Compel Saveri & Saveri, Inc. to Produce Certain Documents
17	and Deposition Transcripts. Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of the
18	certified reporter's transcript of the September 20, 2012 proceedings before the Special Master.
19	
20	I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America
21	that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
22	
23	DATED: October 31, 2012
24	
25	By /s/ Michael W. Scarborough
26	MICHAEL W. SCARBOROUGH
27	
28	

Exhibit A

Case 4:07-ev-05944-JST - Document 1426-1 - Filed 10/31/12 - Page 4 of 36

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

MASTER FILE NO. 07-CV-5944 SC

MDL NO. 1917

IN RE: CATHODE RAY TUBE (CRT) CASE NO. 07-CV-5944 SC ANTITRUST LITIGATION

THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO:

CASE NO. CV-12-80151 MISC

IN RE: APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE FOR THE ISSUANCE OF SUBPOENAS PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1782 TO OBTAIN DISCOVERY FOR USE IN A FOREIGN PROCEEDING

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

SEPTEMBER 20, 2012

2:00 P.M.

2 EMBARCADERO, SUITE 1500

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

REPORTED BY:

RUBY SANCHEZ

CSR NO. 12971, RPR

Page 1

_	Case 4:07-cv-05944-1ST Documen	1 1 142 6	-
	Pag	ge 2	Page 4
1	APPEARANCES:		SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
2	For Sharp (via telephonic appearance):		2 THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 20, 2012, 2:00 P.M.
3	PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON LLP		PROCEEDINGS
4	BRUCE H. SEARBY 2001 K Street NW		1
5	Washington, D.C. 20006 202-223-7355		HON. LEGGE: Tell me your name please, sir.
6	202-204-5604 Fax bsearby@paulweiss.com		MR. SEARBY: Yes. Searby, S-E-A-R-B-Y.
7	For Saveri & Saveri:		HON. LEGGE: Mr. Searby, you're in Washington.
8	SAVERI & SAVERI		MR. SEARBY: I'm in Washington with Paul Weiss.
9	GEOFFREY RUSHING RICK A. SAVERI		HON. LEGGE: Yes. Okay. And you're the one that's
10	706 Sansome Street	1	• • •
11	San Francisco, CA 94111 415-217-6810	1	
12	415-217-6813 Fax grushing@saveri.com	1:	2 HON. LEGGE: We do have a lot of attorneys here in the
13	rick@saveri.com	1	·
14	For the Samsung SDI Defendants:	1	
15	SHEPPARD MULLIN MICHAEL W. SCARBOROUGH	1	
16	TYLER CUNNINGHAM Four Embarcadero Center, 17th Floor	1	^ *
17	San Francisco, CA 94111 415-434-9100	1	•
18	415-434-3947 Fax mscarborough@sheppardmullin.com	1	
19	tcunningham@sheppardmullin.com	1	
20	For the Hitachi Defendants:	2	
	MORGAN LEWIS COUNSELORS AT LAW	2	
21	J. CLAYTON EVERETT, JR. MICHELLE PARK CHIU	2:	······································
22	One Market, Spear Street Tower San Francisco, CA 94105	2	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
23	202-739-5860 415-442-1184	2	
24	415-442-1001 Fax jeverett@morganlewis.com	2	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
25	mchiu@morganlewis.com	-	inic. Continuon livi. Good anternoon, your monor. Tyler
	Pag	ge 3	Page 5
1	Paç APPEARANCES (CONTINUED):		Page 5 L Cunningham, Sheppard Mullin for the Samsung SDI defendants.
1 2	APPEARANCES (CONTINUED):		-
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HON. LEGGE: Are you with me to this point? 2 MR_SEARBY: Yes

HON. LEGGE: We'll proceed ahead here then. And when other parties come to speak, we'll do our best to keep their voices up so you can hear us. In the event you cannot hear us, please let me know.

MR. SEARBY: Thank you.

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HON. LEGGE: I think I should start out with how I personally got to this point and where my head is at the moment,

First of all, I'm the Judge, Judicial Officer, who signed the subpoena at issue. It first came to me, of course, on ex parte basis and I had not had any prior experience with Section 1782. I did check the procedural requirements of that section. I didn't get into any of the jurisprudence that has developed around it, but just checked the procedural requirements to see whether the application for the subpoena was proper. I think if memory serves me, I found a couple of things I wasn't quite certain about and contacted somebody, I believe, at the Bingham McCutchen Firm and a clarification on the procedure and some additions, I forgot what they were, and did issue the subpoena.

Now, I did so wholly on the basis of the satisfaction of what I believe was satisfaction of the procedural requirements for the issuance of the subpoena and didn't deal with its merits the work that's been done and attempt to use it and that's that.

I think it's also unfair to a certain extent that the subpoena was served on the attorneys, because obviously what Sharp wants is not the plaintiff's documents. What Sharp wants is the documents of the defendants that they're suing in the Korean jurisdiction. And, also, I think a subpoena more properly had been addressed to particular defendants for the documents they want; not that that's even a valid consideration, but part of my view from 50,000 feet on the fairness level. But instead, the burden, at least initial burden, has been placed here on the plaintiffs for them to scoop up all of this discovery, package it up and neatly deliver it to some other plaintiff in some other jurisdiction for use in some other place. Now, that's my feeling on the general concept of fairness.

With that having been said, I realize that I have to delve into the jurisprudence under Section 1782 to analyze what it says, to analyze what the courts have said about it, analyze the restrictions, analyze the four factors under the Intel case, and I have not gotten to that point yet. I've read what you have to say, but I haven't sat down to really try to decipher and understand it and make an application here.

So that is where I am. I've certainly not made up my mind about it, but I find it was just simply fair to tell both sides what my initial view of the basic gut and fairness of the

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or its balancing of interests or its discretionary aspects of law. That, however, is what is now before me. I knew this day would be coming. It was absolutely inevitable from the scope of the subpoena.

So I have read the motions and have read the oppositions to the motion and in fairness want to tell all sides my initial reactions, as I said, where my head is.

It seems to me -- it struck me at the time and still strikes me, that there's an element of an unfairness about this subpoena and its intended uses. My position on that is after having read the briefs and without getting into the jurisprudence of Section 1782, it seems to me there's just something basically unfair to be in a case like we have here in this district where a lot of lawyers on both the defense side and plaintiff's side have spent several years participating in discovery and other procedures other than discovery, of course, also, and have put a lot of equity into this case, and the result from a discovery point of view is, I gather, has been over five million pages of paper. And that having done that, that a third party can come in and simply scoop it all up and take it off to a foreign jurisdiction, a foreign jurisdiction in which the subpoenaing party could not get that discovery because of the rules of that jurisdiction, so dump all this discovery on to that court and with no paying of dues is maybe what I should

say. That somebody could sit back, take the advantage of all

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matter looked to me at this time before doing the work that has 2 to be done.

Now, that having been said, I guess the first motion that was filed here was the defendants' motion to quash. So I believe that I should turn to the defendants for their opening presentation before I turn to Sharp.

MR. CUNNINGHAM: Thank you, your Honor.

I'm going to speak mainly about the factors under the Intel case, but I think sort of -- there's a single question that cuts through most of the analysis here and that is whether Sharp's application is an attempt to circumvent the discovery limitations that Korea has put on litigants. And I think that the answer to that question is clearly it is. That answer follows directly from the facts here as told by Sharp itself.

And those facts are that Korea does allow document discovery, both from the parties and from third parties. That the discovery allowed is limited. Korea places limitations on documents available to litigants. I know that Sharp says that those limitations are so draconian that they can't get a single document in Korea. We think that's an overstatement and dispute that. But in any event, because of those limitations, Sharp has made no effort here to obtain discovery under Korean rules. I should say I think technically that's not an admission that Sharp has made, but we presented evidence to that effect and Sharp hasn't rebutted it. Fourthly and finally, because of

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1	those limitations or perceived limitations, Sharp has proceeded	1	that the subpoena was overly burdensome because it just sought
2	with this application under 1782 in the first instance to this	2	the entire discovery record from that case with no effort to
3	court, so its court of first resort is to U.S. District Court.	3	tailor it to AMD's needs.
4	Well, your Honor, I think that that's circumvention.	4	So I think that those two factors really dictate the
5	That's Sharp going around the obstacle in its path or the	5	results here; the blatant and runaround of Korean discovery
6	perceived obstacle in its path which is the limitations that the	6	procedure and the major overreach by Sharp. Those two factors
7	Korean Civil Procedure Act places on document discovery. I	7	dictate that the subpoena should be quashed and I think that the
8	don't know what else you would call it. Sharp, of course,	8	rest of the analysis under the Intel factors really flows from
9	disputes that and says that they're not trying to circumvent the	9	there, and I'd sort of like to go ahead and touch upon some of
10	rules, but they really offer no explanation for why that is.	10	the other points under the Intel factors.
11	They just offer their own Ipse dixit. So that I think is the	11	The first factor
12	major factor.	12	HON. LEGGE: You're telling me that Judge Ware got the
13	The other major factor here that places this application	13	Intel case back on remand from the Supreme Court?
14	sort of outside of the norm is Sharp's attempt to	14	MR. CUNNINGHAM: It's true. Yes.
15	import/wholesale the entire U.S. discovery record from this	15	HON. LEGGE: And he walked through that case, Intel case
16	litigation. I guess maybe I should say export, trying to export	16	was in front of him and evaluated the four factors?
17	that entire discovery record to Korea.	17	MR. CUNNINGHAM: That's true.
18	Sharp's made no articulation of why they need this	18	HON. LEGGE: Go ahead.
19	entire five-million-page-plus record.	19	MR. CUNNINGHAM: So under the, what I would call the
20	HON. LEGGE: Mr. Searby, are you able to hear counsel's	20	receptivity factor, which asks whether the Korean court would be
21	comments?	21	receptive to judicial assistance to getting these documents, I
22	MR. SEARBY: I am, very clearly. Thank you.	22	think this goes to the point that your Honor made somewhat in
23	HON. LEGGE: Okay. Thank you.	24	that it's a kind of a fundamental fairness analysis. And I would submit that no court would be receptive to a procedure
25	Go ahead, please. MR. CUNNINGHAM: No articulation for why they need this	25	whereby one side gets to opt out entirely from the discovery
	With Continuous to artefulation for why they need this	23	whereby one side gets to opt out entirely from the discovery
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Korean litigation would also thwart the Court's stated goal of 1 2 efficiency, definitely does not favor the efficiency to 3 introduce five million-plus pages of documents into the 4 litigation and it runs contrary to Korea's statement it made 5 when acceding to the Hague Treaty that they will not execute 6 letters of request issued for the purpose of obtaining pretrial 7 discovery of documents if the letter of request doesn't identify

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particular documents.

Sharp responds with two points, I think, basically on this issue of receptivity. One, they offer a hearsay statement from the Korean court, which we think shouldn't be regarded, it should be disregarded as hearsay. But even if the court were to consider it, I think it's of very little value because what they say is they -- they say they told the court of their plan to take discovery through the 1782 procedure and the court, quote, acknowledged that effort. So, again, I think the court shouldn't consider that statement, but I think it's a long distance between acknowledging and actually stating that the court would be receptive to those documents.

And then the second point that Sharp makes on this factor is that Korea has lax rules regarding admissibility, and I think that Sharp here sort of equates admissibility with being receptive to the documents and I don't think it's the same thing. In fact, I think at times those two things can be at cross-purposes. I think that if the court has lax rules and

question that the court can order the KFTC to produce documents.

Now, Sharp says that the KFTC wouldn't comply with any 3 court order or would not produce documents, and I submit that 4 that's really not credible because Sharp in its own complaint in 5 the Korean court said that that was, in fact, their plan to 6 conduct document discovery, that they were going to request that 7 the court order the KFTC to produce documents from its 8 investigation. So I don't know what's changed. I haven't heard 9 anything from the other side about what's changed from that time 10 until now, from the time they filed their complaint and said 11 that that was their plan for discovery to now when they say they 12 actually can't get any documents through the KFTC.

I understand Sharp makes the argument that they don't have enough information in order to make an application to the Court because they need to know certain details about the documents in order to do that. We've explained in our reply brief, offered some suggestions as to how they might go about that. I won't go into that, maybe I will when I get a chance to talk again or if your Honor has any questions about it.

So the court can get -- has jurisdiction over the Korean defendants and can order the KFTC to produce documents. So the question is really: What's left after that? Is there anything left that Sharp needs beyond what's available to it in Korea?

I haven't heard Sharp articulate any need for anything beyond what might be available from those sources. So the

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really no control over documents that are admissible, that may well mean that the court would not want to see five million-plus pages of documents introduced in its litigation, and some of the cases do talk about this in terms of the danger of swamping the court or clogging the court with foreign discovery, and I think that's a real danger here.

So moving on to the next factor under Intel, which I would call the availability factor, or the question is: Does the foreign tribunal have jurisdiction over and can it order others to produce the evidence that the applicant is seeking? Here we challenge the assertion that Sharp can't get any documents at all through the Korean discovery procedures. I think what they can't get is the really broad U.S. style discovery that they're seeking here, but Korea does have procedures, as I said, allowing the document discovery. I don't think there's any question that the Korean court has jurisdiction over the defendants that are before it and can order them to produce documents, and I think both sides have actually cited to the article under the civil procedure act that allows for that.

It's also the case, and I don't think this is disputed, that the Korean court can order the KFTC, the Fair Trade Commission, which is the antitrust enforcement agency in Korea which conducted an investigation into the CRT matter and produced a report about their investigation. There's no

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bottom line here is that the Korean rules provide for discovery and those are the rules that should govern Sharp's Korean lawsuit.

The fourth and final factor under the Intel analysis has to do with whether the application is unduly intrusive or wholly burdensome. In this regard, I think the application speaks for itself. Your Honor made the point that it's really hard to conceive of a broader request than what Sharp has made here, which is basically give me all the documents that you have without attempting to tailor it at all to their particular needs or even articulate what their needs are.

And I'd like to say a final word finally about confidentiality concerns. The defendants have a real concern about maintaining the confidentiality of their documents here and we believe that the protective order can't be adequately modified to evaluate those concerns. And I think the real difference here between sort of the garden-variety requests that normally happens from a litigant in another matter when they make an application or try to gain discovery documents from another matter and to try to modify a protective order in order to suit that need is that when that happens and it's purely within U.S. borders, the Court can have some assurance that they'll be an adequate protective order in that other matter that will maintain the confidentiality of those documents. Here, that's not the case. We've presented evidence

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and, again, it hasn't been rebutted that the Korean court doesn't have that statutory authority, can't issue a protective order of that nature.

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speaking for.

2 3 4 So I understand that Sharp has said that they would --5 suggested that they could -- the court could somehow modify the 6 protective order in this matter to alleviate our concerns, but 7 they haven't really articulated what that modification would 8 look like or how it would work and, in fact, I can't conceive of 9 a way that it would work that would allow Sharp to actually use 10 the documents in Korean litigation, because to use them in the 11 Korean litigation, they would have to be showing them to all 12 sorts of people who are not parties to that protective order. 13 They would show them to the court or witnesses, you know, 14 possibly experts and consultants and to the other defendants in 15 the Korean litigation. So we just don't think it's workable and 16 we have a real concern about confidentiality. I think I'll 17 leave it there, your Honor. 18 HON. LEGGE: Okay. All right. Mr. Saveri, do you wish 19 to speak on behalf --20 MR. RUSHING: Yes. Thank you. I'll do that. 21 HON. LEGGE: Would you mind coming down here a little 22 bit closer so Mr. Searby can hear you. 23 MR. RUSHING: Your Honor. 24 HON. LEGGE: Would you identify yourself and who you are

attempt to circumvent the requirements of Section 1782, but I'm not going to repeat those arguments. But under American jurisprudence as well, it's not proper as the Haworth case holds and as we explained in our brief. It's not generally proper to seek documents from a third party that you can obtain from a party opponent.

And in the Haworth Case, Haworth the Federal Circuit upheld a denial of a motion to compel by the lower court which held just that. And that case involved a single document and the court said, No, you have to try to get them from your party opponent before you seek them from a third party. So we would add that as an additional reason to deny the motion to compel.

Finally, we are very concerned about becoming some sort of fulfillment center for other foreign litigation to become the go-to place to get all the documents in the CRT case for use in your foreign litigation. We don't want that business. We want to spend our time litigating our cases, particularly this one, and we don't -- we have a lot to do and we have a lot of that kind of work to do and we don't -- it's not a convenient thing for us at all even to the extent that our time is compensated or some of our time for us to be doing. We don't want that business and we are very concerned about that.

And, finally, just briefly on the burden itself, we have a declaration that we've estimated as best we can at this point that it will take approximately 30 to 40 hours of time to do

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MR. RUSHING: This is Jeff Rushing on behalf of Saveri and the direct purchasers, I think I should say.

Your Honor, I'll be brief. We said it in our paper, but our view here is that we should not be a party to this proceeding, and basically I think it breaks down to two, kind of, categories of reasons.

First is a matter of common sense and I think, as your Honor noted, fairness. These are not our documents. They belong to defendants. We have them by virtue of our participation in this case, but our interest in them is not as great as defendants. They're for use in a case that we have no interest in, but the defendants, at least some of them, have a great interest in. And we think the burden of production, actually, it would be significantly less for the defendants themselves to produce these documents to the extent they ultimately are produced is less than our burden because primarily by virtue of their much greater resources.

And it would appear, I think as Mr. Cunningham explained, that we are a party to this proceeding only because of some tactical decisions made by Sharp based on their review of it's better for them to subpoena us than it is to subpoena the defendants under the jurisprudence of Section 1782. So as a practical matter, we don't feel we should be here. And as a matter of law, also, I think we shouldn't be here. Again, as Mr. Cunningham explained under 1782, it seems clear this is an

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1 this. There's nothing contrary in the record, so I think we can 2 leave it at that. But I will say that it's a much more

3 complicated process than Sharp would have the court believe.

4 There are many, many files that have been produced in the case

5 in many different formats. It doesn't -- the downloading

6 process does not work every single time. There's many times it

7 doesn't work properly and you have to sort of sort it out and

8 back it up and figure out what went wrong and do it again. That

9 takes time. And then there's also a substantial amount of time 10 to be spent verifying that you've done what you've supposed to

11 have done, that your production is complete, that you have

included things you shouldn't include and that you have included

everything you should. With that your Honor, I will --

HON. LEGGE: All right. Mr. Searby, you wish to speak

in support of your motion -- in opposition of the motion to quash and in support of your motion to compel?

MS. NEVINS: I just got a call saying they all got disconnected to you.

HON. LEGGE: What happened?

MS. NEVINS: They said it was about four minutes ago.

(Pause)

HON. LEGGE: Mr. Searby, I understand you have been disconnected here. Apparently a line here connecting the Starphone to the phone system got accidentally disconnected.

How long have you been offline?

documents we have and the documents defendants have and there's -- we shouldn't -- there's no reason for them to proceed against us first in that respect. Third, we are very concerned about becoming the go-to source for all foreign proceedings related to this conspiracy, your Honor. As your Honor knows, we contend it's a global

what's happening here. Again, there's no difference in the

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have pretty solid answers to all the questions that have been raised by the Saveri firm and the defendants.

I want to cover the three most important arguments in these motions and I think that I'll also try to address the confidentiality provisions, although I think that's sort of a secondary argument for reasons I'll explain. It's downstream of whether providing these documents to Sharp is a good idea in the

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first place.

The first big point is that Sharp has a strong need for using the 1782 procedure to seek relevant evidence. The second point I'm going to get into is there's no genuine indication that the 1782 procedure is likely to offend the Korean court and to the contrary the court will be receptive to considering evidence gathered in this manner. And, third, the intended discovery would not impose any undue burden.

But before getting into these points and any others that interest your Honor and some of your Honor's concerns at the outset, I want to say that when you consider the positions that defendants and Saveri take, taken altogether they simply defy common sense.

Now, on the one hand they say that Sharp can't use 1782 because it hasn't tried using Korean discovery procedures, but on the other hand they say Korean discovery procedures are so limited that the Korean court would be hostile to 1782 relief. This Catch-22 that defendants have set out can't be and isn't how 1782 works. We would not be here, your Honor, wasting everyone's time if Korean counsel thought that Sharp could get documents to prove its case through the Korean court. And there wouldn't be a 1782 procedure in the books unless litigants were sometimes unable to get discovery from the foreign court.

Another example of trying to have it both ways, defendants say at one point that Sharp should only be asking for computers, not the CPTs for TV sets. You can read the declaration and that's what that report is about.

Sharp can proffer now based on our review in the last couple days of this report by Sharp's Korean counsel that this report refers to no price fixing of CPTs. Sharp's Korean action only involves CPTs, price fixing of CPTs that Sharp purchased and the KFTC is undisputed, shut down its investigation of CPT price fixing with a one-sentence letter. There is no report from the KFTC identifying documents as being related to CPT price fixing. Therefore, we could not go after those documents using Korean court procedures. As both parties agree, are limited and require you to specify exactly what documents you need.

Defendants' reply brief does not even meet Sharp's argument that it is seeking with the 1782 subpoena documents produced by various parties that are not even before the Korean court and it cannot be said could be brought within the jurisdiction of the Korean court. There's been no showing of that. The Korean complaint alleges that Sharp was a victim of CRT price fixing at these glass meetings; same as plaintiffs here in the U.S. have alleged. The Korean complaint that Sharp filed identified as coconspirators not only the name of defendants in Korea, but also other companies; Chunghwa, Hitachi, Panasonic, Toshiba, who have been subject as defendants in the United States to years of discovery in the U.S.

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CPT documents, color picture tube documents, but at another
 point they tell Sharp to go after documents in a Korean Fair
 Trade Commission Report that so far as we can tell only has to
 do with CDT, color display tubes.

Defendants fault us for not getting a court transcript from the Korean court. There is no transcript to get.

Defendants tell us to ask the Saveri firm to identify the documents we need for our case to go to the Korean court, but we did ask Saveri, and in Saveri's view as class counsel they were not free to do this.

Naturally everyone is going to say that we ought to be going to someone else for these documents, but here we are three months into this process and Sharp satisfies all the statutory requirements and all the discretionary factors weigh in favor of enforcing the subpoena.

Now, I want to now get into more detail on the first point; Sharp's need for 1782 relief. Your Honor, defendants' reply is flat wrong in its lead point, arguing that Sharp could have applied for discovery in Korea. They referred to a 169-page report by the Korean Fair Trade Commission, KFTC, citing 280 documents. And they say, You should have asked for those 280 documents in that report. But as their own defendant -- I'm sorry, as their own declarant, Mr. Troy, makes clear at paragraph 3 of his declaration that they submitted with the reply, this KFTC report related to price fixing of CPTs for

Now, again, even as to the subset of conspirators in the Korean complaint that are named defendants before the Korean court, Sharp is not presently in a position to use the limited Korean discovery procedures to make document requests. And this is not news. Sharp first explained this three months ago in its ex parte application for 1782 relief. So this is not news and it's nothing Sharp has ever needed to run from.

Instead, what you have here is a common-sense situation where 1782 relief is appropriate because the United States has more expansive discovery procedures than are available in a foreign proceeding and it is the policy behind 1782, in fact, as explained by court decisions including Intel that we're going to permit this broader discovery even if broader discovery is not available in the foreign court because we want to encourage foreign courts to cooperate and to expand their discovery procedures.

Now, what this all boils down to is that instead of the burden in hand, by which I mean the U.S. discovery, the defendants and Saveri want Sharp to chase after a whole bunch of birds in the bush and the efficiency and fairness and practicality of this is not there. We have a need to issue the subpoena for the collection of discovery that is all gathered together rather than pursuing probably futile efforts with many, many different companies that many of which are not before the Korean court.

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This is -- and by the way, it is, in fact, precedented 1 2 in 1782 cases for parties to come in with the 1782 application and ask for collections of discovery that had already been 3 4 produced in the course of U.S. litigation. The application that 5 we put forward to the court laid out a number of these cases, in 6 particular on page 8 of the ex parte application Schmitz case, 7 the In Re Linerboard Antitrust Litigation case, there's also on 8 page 11 of the ex parte application we cite to -- I'm sorry, 9 page 10 of the ex parte application we cite U.S. Philips Corp. 10 as well as In Re Linerboard Antitrust Litigation. So it is, in 11 fact, not uncommon for collections of discovery that had been 12 worked up, as the Court says, with someone's sweat equity over the course of a litigation to be granted access to other parties 13 14 who need those, who demonstrated the need and the relevance of 15 those collections of evidence to go through for purposes of 16 foreign litigation.

So I understand the Court on the sweat equity point; however, it is just not -- had this not been a concern that the jurisprudence has recognized. And, in fact, parties come in all the time and join litigation and they opt out of cases, class cases, and they come in and they obtain access to the discovery record that's been worked up thus far in the case. This is nothing unusual.

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Now, the next major point here, the second major point is that the Korean court is not offended by the use of 1782, but because 1782 contemplated situations where foreign discovery

2 processes were more limited than they are in the United States.

3 So it simply does not -- it's not taking out the circumvention

4 of foreign discovery procedures that we seek evidence here that

5 we could not get there, and this is a key point. The proper

question, your Honor, is not whether the foreign court itself

7 would order the discovery, but whether the foreign court will

8 consider the evidence that the party gathers in the United

9 States. That is the test. That is whether a court is receptive

10 to the evidence or to the contrary would be offended by being 11 presented with this evidence, and there is no evidence of that,

12 no suggestion of that here.

> On the real issue of whether the foreign court will consider any evidence that is produced under a 1782 application here, Sharp's position has support from two sources. First, Korean law is receptive with the consideration of evidence that was gathered abroad. And, second, a Korean court in this case had a reaction that was not hostile and was even positive when apprised of the 1782 application by Sharp. Defendants' reply fails to offer any evidence contradictory to Sharp showing on either of these two points. And I want to take those points one by one.

> First, Sharp's declarant, a Korean counsel named Mr. Oh, reports as a percipient witness on the court colloquy on June 28th, 2012, and he draws reasonable factual inferences from the

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1 is rather receptive to any evidence that would be gathered in a 2 foreign proceeding. This is a key point under the Intel case 3 and the Intel factors. It's very important that the use of 1782 4 not offend a foreign court, but this is not a case where the 5 foreign body has expressed offense at Sharp's 1782 application 6 in a way that would weigh against the exercise at the Court's 7 discretion, and there are such cases.

A party that does not have means in the foreign court to pursue discovery there does not by using 1782 circumvent, quote, unquote, the foreign court's restrictions of evidence gathering. And the case that you need to read, your Honor, to bring that point home, although there are several, is the Heraeus Kulzer case where Judge Posner is writing for the Seventh Circuit. This case is cited at page 7 of Sharp's opposition. So it is not nearly by -citation up. Page 7 of your opposition letter?

HON. LEGGE: Hang on a minute, please. Let me pull that

MR. SEARBY: Yes, your Honor.

19 HON. LEGGE: The one cited in your second paragraph?

MR. SEARBY: Yes, your Honor.

21 The Seventh Circuit tells that Germany's limited 22 discovery procedure did not mean than the German court would not 23 be receptive to that same discovery if obtained in the United

24 States and, therefore, the 1782 process was appropriate.

This situation, that happens all the time precisely

1 statements that he reports, and that's in paragraph 13 of 2 Mr. Oh's declaration. I can read it to you your Honor if you'd

HON. LEGGE: Wait a minute. I think I have it in front of me here. It begins at the bottom of page five and continues over to the top of page six.

MR. SEARBY: So, your Honor, defendants' only response to Mr. Oh's declaration is that it's inadmissible hearsay, but it's not. Sharp told the court, the Korean court, about the 1782 application; that's not hearsay, that's notice. The court then asked how long it will take to do the procedure; that's not hearsay, that's a question. The court postponed further proceeding in the Korean case until Sharp submits evidence; that's not hearsay, it's a procedural act by the court.

In any event, your Honor, the hearsay rule is just not applicable to a discovery motion like this, like what we're doing right now. There's a case for that, Cooper Hospital 183 F.R.D. 119 at 129. This is not the type of motion where you need to even consider the hearsay rule. The defendants note a bunch of cases.

HON. LEGGE: Wait a minute. My concern was what Mr. Oh has said here. What you argued for Mr. Oh is not that it's hearsay, it's the fact that all I get from paragraph 13 is that the Korean Judge was told that you go through some discovery procedure in the U.S. and that you're doing it. And he told the

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Court it would take some time and the Court agreed to not fix a date.

Now, to me, that doesn't shed any, any inference that once the Court sees the volume of the evidence and what it is, that it's going to accept it. And there's nothing here to indicate that the Court was told that this is five million pages of document discovery and 18 or 20 depositions, whatever it is. You're just silent on the subject. Now, maybe Mr. Oh drew conclusions, but that's not a clear statement of what the Court said that it would or would not consider it. It's just give me more time to do what you want to do and then we'll see what it is

MR. SEARBY: Well, your Honor, I think it's time for me to jump at this point about allegedly dumping five million documents of discovery on the Korean court. That is a myth that the defendants and Mr. Saveri have cumulated here. There's no intention of introducing into the Korean court five million pages. That would simply be the documents that Sharp could access and review. If the Korean court only needs to see the documents that Sharp in the end determines it needs to put on its case in Korea, not five million documents. We have, in fact, no idea of the volume of documents that are in the end going to be worth submitting, are going to be of sufficient evidentiary value to submit to the Korean court. So it is really a myth and a scare tactic for the defendants and Saveri

correct?

MR. SEARBY: Your Honor, perhaps some subsidiaries of -some subsidiary companies of the parent companies that are defendants in the U.S. case.

HON. LEGGE: So you don't think you've got in Korea any defendants that are either themselves or through parents or parties in the United States litigation?

MR. SEARBY: Your Honor, I have a list of the Korean defendants and they're Samsung entities, they are LG Philips, LP Displays, there are a couple of names that are not entirely familiar, Meridian Solar Display Company, but by enlarge these are entities whose families, corporate families are involved in the U.S. litigation.

HON. LEGGE: Okay. Thank you. Go ahead, please.

MR. SEARBY: The other thing I wanted to note is that
Sharp raises the point about the Korean court's reaction to the
1782 application. Not only to make the point that there was
apparently a positive reaction to news of the 1782 application,
but also that there was no hostility, that there was no offense
taken, and it seemed to be received, at a minimum, neutrally, we
would argue positively.

Now, what defendants and Mr. Saveri really need to show in order to persuade this court that this is a bad idea, is that this is going to rub the Korean court the wrong way and that they're going to take offense.

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to raise this prospect of a document dump of five million pages on the Korean court. There's no reason to think that the Korean court is going to ever have to deal with a volume of paperwork like that. So it is not a burden on the Korean court. It is documents that Sharp wants access to for selection of useful evidence and we don't know exactly what that's going to be.

HON. LEGGE: Let me ask you another question. What are the defendants in your Korean case going to get and have access to from this material?

MR. SEARBY: Your Honor, we have every intention of sharing whatever records we receive from this application with the defendants in the Korean case. We imagine that they would ask for them and imagine that we'd have no reason not to give them any of the materials. In fact, in the order that your Honor signed, it expressly contemplated that the parties to the Korean litigation would have access to the materials because the parties would need to adhere to the U.S. protective order and otherwise take measures to protect the confidentiality of those documents. We entirely expect that the defendants could have these documents as well and there's no unfair advantage or unfair tactic involved here.

22 The other thing I want to say --

HON. LEGGE: Wait a minute. Let me follow through with a couple of things. You do have defendants in your Korean case who are not defendants in the United States case; is that

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Now, they have fallen flat in terms of that showing and they do not dispute that the Korean Code of Civil Procedure permits the Korean court to consider any evidence; that's Article 202. They also do not dispute that Article 296(2) of the Korean Civil Procedure Act, which is cited by Mr. Oh in his declaration at paragraph 17, that this article permits consideration of evidence gathered abroad.

So what we have here is a situation where Korean law says very clearly the Korean court can look at this. The Korean court can take this evidence that you bring in from overseas and consider it and take it for whatever it thinks it's worth. So you have legal principles that indicate a receptivity to the evidence that has been gathered abroad.

Again, your Honor, the question is not whether the foreign court itself would order the discovery, but whether the foreign court will consider the evidence that the party, Sharp in this case, gathers in the U.S.

HON. LEGGE: Is it not some evidence of resistance when you look at Korean law which does limit discovery so severely and will not engage in -- what do I want to say -- international intercourse over such things as services, subpoenas and service of process and the Hague Act procedures for doing various things? Is that not an indication that they are running their courts the way they want to run their court and they don't want as many interferences from foreign courts?

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1 MR. SEARBY: No. Again, your Honor, that's not an 2 indication. And this goes back to the Heraeus case, the Heraeus 3 Kulzer case that I spoke about earlier. Judge Posner basically

4 said. You cannot draw that conclusion. You cannot draw that 5

conclusion based upon the more limited discovery procedure of a

6 foreign court. That they would be hostile to being handed

7 evidence gathered abroad in a more liberal fashion, a more broad 8

type of discovery. That is precisely -- your concern is

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9 precisely the one that Judge Posner and other courts address and 10 put to bed. This is not an indication of hostility.

Your Honor, when a federal court of a foreign tribunal is considered hostile in the 1782 jurisprudence that we've read, it lets the U.S. court know it. In fact, in the Intel case on the remand that counsel cited earlier in this hearing, which I frankly -- they did not brief this and so I'm reading this for the very first time on this call, but on the remand in that case, the European Commission actually wrote amicus briefs to

18 support the finding that the European Commission does not need 19 or want this Court's assistance in obtaining the documents. And

20 based upon that amicus brief, the court in remand on the Intel 21 case said that the EC is not receptive to judicial assistance in

22 this case and that's really what this Intel case on remand 23 turned on. And so --

HON, LEGGE: Do I have a record of that, that is, what happened to the Intel case on remand in the papers before me? was 67 or 70 requests and so this is a different case, your Honor

3 HON. LEGGE: Could I have the cite please to Judge 4 Ware's decision on a remand. Could you give me the cite?

MR. SEARBY: It's 2004 WL 2282320.

6 HON. LEGGE: Okay. Thank you.

MR. SEARBY: So it is not exactly -- this case does not truly turn on the point that Counsel Cho decided for. It turned on the fact that the European Commission flatly and plainly rejected the need for this evidence, and then just as a throwaway point for the sake of completeness, the court knocked the burdensomeness of the request.

Your Honor, I'd like to turn to the undue burden and overbreadth arguments now. This is a key point. This is largely Mr. Saveri's issue. I would say, truly Mr. Saveri's issue.

According to Mr. Saveri's declarations, the discovery files at issue that we're all arguing about has been transferred to a single server, which means that in practice, and this is my interpretation, your Honor, the transfer will involve a little more than someone monitoring an automated transfer process for these computer files to be put on a hard drive and given to us. This is not a burden, a serious burden upon Mr. Saveri to begin with. Mr. Saveri claims his IT team would spend 30 to 40 hours doing this, but in saying that, your Honor, Mr. Saveri has not

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1 MR. SEARBY: I do not think so, your Honor. I'm not 2 familiar.

HON. LEGGE: I didn't remember seeing it, so I thought maybe I missed something.

MR. SEARBY: I'm going to make another point or two about the case then that defendants did not brief, despite the moving papers and the reply papers.

It says this is 2004 Westlaw, 2282320, and this case turns on the -- basically the fact that the EC did not want this judicial assistance and it made that very clear. That's hostility. That's a lack of receptivity, not some language in the Hague Accession Treaty that only addresses what a Korean court will do with an inbound request for discovery through a Korean court in Korea. That's just a very attenuated line of logic that defendants are citing as proof that the Korean court would be hostile to documents that came from the U.S. through a 1782 procedure.

I also, while I'm on the subject of Intel, your Honor, I want to point out that, yes, as counsel stated and I'm learning for the first time here, the court on remand did say that the document requests were unduly burdensome. What counsel didn't tell you is that the court found it, quote, largely unnecessary and purely academic to address this doctrine and only did so, quote, for the sake of completeness, and then it addressed the fact that there was no attempt to tailor its request and there

taken account of the fact that Sharp is committed to pay the

costs of a vendor to come in and transfer the hard drive data

3 instead of having his personnel sit there while the files copy.

4 Sharp will pay for that vendor to come in and do that.

5 Mr. Saveri's 30- to 40-hour estimate does not account for what

6 burden he would still have after we make that accommodation.

7 So, really, the burden here is extraordinarily light. And I

8 would further add that by asking for the discovery file, and

9 we've now limited our request to defendants' documents, not

10 everybody's documents but defendants in the U.S., their

11 documents and defendants' depositions. By limiting it to the

12 discovery coming in from defendants, it's all preloaded on a

13 hard drive, we thought we were reducing the burden on the part

14 of Mr. Saveri, and we are. We're not asking for complicated

15 categories of documents in which people actually have to apply

16 lots of judgment and analysis to whether they're responsive and

17 therefore we're making this incredibly easy and the burden very,

very light. It is ironic that they're pointing to the way that

we're going about this as the cause of burden merely by the

number of documents involved, five million, when, in fact, this

all can be done within a few hours by an outside vendor for

virtually no cost to Mr. Saveri.

HON. LEGGE: A couple of comments. One is that you could have taken the burden from them entirely by directing your subpoena to the defendants individually instead of to

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the court.

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- 1 Mr. Saveri's office. And, secondly, I'm not sure if I order the 2 subpoena enforced that I'm going to go along with the idea of an 3 outside vendor. It seems to me there's some risks over control
- 4 of their documents and their database that is presented by their 5 turning that access over to an outside vendor, but that's a very
- 6 minor point.

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- Go ahead, please.
- 8 MR. SEARBY: Yes, your Honor.
- 9 By the way, we would make every -- we would allow 10 Mr. Saveri to use his judgment and pick the vendor and be in 11 control of the whole process; we would just pay for it. But to
- 12 your Honor's point about directing this instead to a defendant
- 13 in the case instead of Mr. Saveri, the fact is that before we
- 14 got to all these discretionary factors under Intel, we had to
- 15 make out the statutory requirements first. And one of those 16 statutory requirements was that the subpoena recipient is in
- 17 possession of the documents that we seek and that they control
- 18 evidence within the Northern District of California. Well,
- 19 Mr. Saveri is the one who made that showing possible as to
- 20 himself. We have his declaration, which we cited in our
- 21 application. And, you know, we don't frankly know who we can go
- 22 to and prove to the court has the entire discovery record in the
- 23 case that we seek from all defendants. We don't have something
- 24 we can submit to your Honor to fill out that statutory
- 25 requirement. Mr. Saveri fulfills that requirement and, again,

relevance for discoverability purposes of these collection of documents

Defendants and Mr. Saveri also argue that Sharp should narrowly tailor its document request, but if we did that, I guarantee you we'd be being accused right now of a huge burden of having to analyze all kinds of very specific tailored document requests. And it should be enough to Sharp to determine which of the documents from the U.S. case about these so-called glass meetings are helpful to its claims about price fixing and CPTs. The burden argument in the end is just an illusion, your Honor, with a big number of filing many of these documents but no actual genuine burden either to Mr. Saveri or to the defendants

I want to talk about the fact that we have tailored our requests somewhat as a result of the meet-and-confer process with Mr. Saveri. The subpoena calls for all documents in the U.S. litigation as we stated in our motion to compel Mr. Saveri. We trimmed that down after speaking with him and we agreed to one of his suggestions that we only seek documents from the defendant and not from the plaintiffs or the victims in the U.S., and so we have, in fact, tailored our requests as much as we could. Mr. Saveri didn't sit down with us and explain to us how to craft just the right document request that would allow him to produce only the documents that are relevant to our claims about CPTs and he didn't give us any other suggestions

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- 1 your Honor, the burden here is a matter of hours versus IT staff
 - paid for by Sharp. It really shouldn't matter whether we
- 3 collect the documents from Mr. Saveri or were able to identify
- 4 some other parties, some other -- some defendant in the case to
- 5 collect the documents from. In either of those cases, the
- 6 burden is not significant and is something that Sharp is willing
 - to assume the cost of.

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Now, Saveri's alternative for us is to go start all over after three months and everything being drawn out in this process and to start over and then I suppose to pursue new

- 11 application on each coconspirator in the Korean case for their
- 12 documents instead of simply and efficiently getting them all
- 13 from one source in a matter of hours at Sharp's expense.
- 14 Sharp's subpoena targets materials that have been already passed
- 15 through a certain filter of relevance to the conspiracy that
- 16 took place through these so-called glass meetings all over Asia
- 17 as alleged in both the Korean complaint and the U.S. case. So
- 18 contrary to what counsel said, that we have very good reason to
- 19 believe that this collection of discovery contains evidence that
- 20 may be useful in our case, and, you know, who's to say how many
- 21 documents we'll wind up needing to use and submit to the Korean
- 22 court. But the fact that this is a collection of documents that
- 23 we would obtain from the same defendants involved in the same
- 24 glass meetings that victimized Sharp is an excellent way of
- 25 understanding the relevance and the discoverability, the

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- 1 for tailoring that would allow us to know that we were not
- missing out on relevant evidence that has been produced again
- 3 through this filter of a case about the same conspiracy in the
- 4 glass meetings. So we have attempted to narrow our requests. 5 We have narrowed our requests. There's no serious suggestion
- 6 out there for us to grab hold of for narrowing it even further
 - and what I suggest --

HON. LEGGE: Wait a minute. Where is all this narrowing? All I have in front of me is a definition of the

10 documents requested in the subpoena and it says: Any and all 11 discovery material obtained during or as a result of discovery

in the direct purchaser action relating to cathode ray tubes

including, but not limited to, color picture tubes. I don't see how that's limited. You must have some either verbal agreement or written agreement with Mr. Saveri that I haven't seen.

MR. SEARBY: Well, your Honor, what you're looking at is the exact subpoena that we served after getting the order from

HON. LEGGE: Yeah. That's right.

MR. SEARBY: After Mr. Saveri took two weeks to object to that subpoena on the grounds of overbreadth and burden, we arranged a meet-and-confer and we met and conferred to try to narrow our requests just as your Honor would like us to and the results of that meet-and-confer was the agreement by Sharp communicated to Mr. Saveri to reduce its requests as I've

Page 46 1 1 more concerned with the just result of the foreign litigation described now. 2 Actually, in our motion to compel on page 3 of our 2 and the parties. In our case, Sharp has been victimized by an 3 motion to compel addressed how we have, since serving the 3 antitrust conspiracy against it to the tune of untold millions 4 subpoena, tried to make clear to Mr. Saveri that we accommodate of dollars. That's what this is ultimately all about. And if 5 his suggestion about limiting our requests to the defendants' 5 Mr. Saveri has to spend a few hours coordinating with some 6 documents and for the defendants' deposition. That is at the 6 document service to transfer hard drives or if we gain access to 7 bottom of page three of our motion to compel, which is document 7 evidence, that is all in the normal course under this 1782 8 1340 on the record. 8 jurisprudence. 9 HON. LEGGE: Wait a minute. Where is that now? 9 HON. LEGGE: Why didn't you sue in the United States? 10 MR. SEARBY: Page 3, your Honor, in our motion to compel 10 MR. SEARBY: Your Honor, I am not -- I'm not Bar'd in 11 letter. 11 Korea. I'm only Bar'd in the State of California. 12 12 HON. LEGGE: Bottom of page 3 at the August 28th HON. LEGGE: Yeah. 13 meet-and-confer. Is that it? 13 MR. SEARBY: But what I think I know is that the 14 MR. SEARBY: Yes. And so we -- and we subsequently made 14 commerce, the sales that are at issue in the Korean litigation 15 the same accommodation as to deposition transcripts. We also 15 are not touching the United States. That there are these glass 16 said that we would pay any fees that are owing to the court 16 meetings --17 reporters or reimburse Mr. Saveri for any cost. So this 17 HON. LEGGE: I understand. 18 meet-and-confer is something that we took seriously and we 18 MR. SEARBY: Okay. 19 latched onto the reasonable suggestions that Mr. Saveri made 19 HON. LEGGE: I understand what you're saying. So U.S. 20 20 during that meet-and-confer to reduce the scope of our request. nexus to most of your sales. 21 21 MR. SEARBY: That's right. And, of course, we'd have That contradicts, frankly, the arguments that you've heard today 22 and that are in the papers that we have made no effort 22 big problems if we sue the United States without that. 23 23 HON. LEGGE: Sure. You wouldn't have problems, you just whatsoever to tailor our requests. We just don't have any basis 24 beyond what we've done to limit our request because Mr. Saveri 24 wouldn't get anything. 25 25 -- we don't know what's in this discovery record, your Honor, so MR. SEARBY: Your Honor, these are the same glass Page 47 Page 49 1 1 we're dependent on Mr. Saveri to explain to us reasonable meetings. So there's, at least as far as we know, that these 2 measures to reduce the scope of our request. In fact, we have 2 are meetings that are fixing the prices globally so that the sales attached to the U.S. results in a U.S. cause of action, et 3 taken him up on some of those. And frankly, you know, we think 3 4 that asking for the defendants' document production and leaving 4 cetera, but it's the same meetings and that's why we need these 5 5 aside everything else, you know, is an excellent way of documents 6 reducing, you know, some of the issues which have been raised. 6 HON. LEGGE: Okay. Anything further? 7 7 But the fact of the matter is that if we were to tailor requests MR. SEARBY: Well, your Honor, again, there's this 8 8 discussion of fairness and how the Korean court would react to with specific document categories in the way that discovery gets 9 done as an initial matter, that would require serious attorney 9 the defendants in the Korean case not having access to the same 10 time. That would require serious paralegal time and boxes and 10 tools that Sharp is using as a result of the 1782 application. 11 boxes being poured through by people. What we are doing is 11 Again, that's not a genuine argument because there is no 12 12 proposal by Sharp to keep this material to itself. And if actually minimizing the burden by asking for the document 13 collection in the way that we have. 13 defendants, frankly, want to pursue their own 1782 application 14 14 here to go after documents that aren't covered by our request, Again, this happens all the time when parties, new 15 15 parties or opt-out plaintiffs enter a case and nobody is out we have nothing to say about that. So it is again a mythical 16 16 argument designed to make it seem like this is unfair and that there complaining that those attorneys and that plaintiff who 17 just entered the case on behalf of the class is unfairly 17 the Korean court would somehow react to the unfairness of our 18 18 benefitting from the discovery that had been worked up by other getting our hands on this discovery collection. 19 19 attorneys in the case up until that point. Again, I think a big thing that your Honor has to 20 There are also many instances, as we've pointed out, of 20 realize is that the lead argument here that we could have gone 21 21 1782 applications being granted where a party involved in after all this discovery in Korea by asking for the documents in 22 22 that KFTC report is completely wrong because it had to do with foreign litigation is granted access to the fruits of a U.S. 23 23 discovery process. And so, you know, there might be some price fixing of products that we didn't buy. 24 visceral reaction there about sweat equity, but the 24 HON. LEGGE: You told me that. I understand. It's a 25 25 jurisprudence simply permits this kind of thing and I think it's matter of common sense anyway. I'm sure you wouldn't go through

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this process if you could get it from your Korean defendants.

All right. Is there anything else you want to add,

Mr. Searby?

MR. SEARBY: Well, your Honor, I could go into the confidentiality and the protective order. I really feel like that's a secondary issue. There's case law saying that a party does not suffer prejudice merely by allowing access to materials already produced to other parties and litigation. There are numerous cases where protective orders have not been found to be serious obstacles to a 1782 application. Here we have a detailed plan for protecting the confidentiality of the documents contrary to what counsel said earlier. I'd be happy to go into that. I do think it's downstream from the wisdom of getting us the documents in the first place.

HON. LEGGE: Well, I'm inclined to think that last comment is correct, that I don't think there's any reason for my discussing that greatly at this point.

So if that is all, Mr. Searby, I think you've done an excellent job of conveying your client's position and so I'll turn back to the defendants to add whatever they want to add to the quashing motion.

22 MR. CUNNINGHAM: Thank you, your Honor.

23 I'll try to respond to those points in kind here, but24 let me just say sort of as an overarching matter, what's

important here is Sharp -- I'll respond to the first point. The

our own discovery from Sharp if you want to place us on equal footing and we would not have an opportunity to do that or anywhere near the same opportunity to do that if we were left to play by the Korean rules, while Sharp plays by U.S. rules.

I heard Mr. Searby say that we're free to apply for our own 1782 application, I don't think that's an answer either. Sharp is a Japanese company, Sharp Corporation, and they've produced very few documents in this litigation that would be available for us to try to get through a 1782 application. And, frankly, that's kind of the tail wagging the dog if you say that it's up to us to mimic their 1782 application to come to the U.S. to get Japanese documents and bring them to Korea. And it's not needed to ensure fairness here. To ensure fairness, all you have to do is quash the subpoena and both parties will try this Korean lawsuit according to Korean rules.

Mr. Searby made the point, maybe I didn't fully understand it, but I heard him say that it's somehow duplicative for us to make the point on the one hand that Korean discovery is limited but on the other hand the Korean court would be hostile to 1782 relief. I think those things actually support each other. I think they go hand in hand. The fact that Korea has these limited discovery rules, that's probative of the fact that they would not appreciate an influx of a document dump from a U.S. discovery campaign. So I don't think those are contradictory at all.

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first point basically being that Sharp has a strong need for documents.

Sharp has tools in order to get documents that are available to them. There's no dispute about that. But you can get documents from the parties, from third parties via discovery tools that are in Korean Rules of Civil Procedure, and those are the rules that should apply to Sharp's Korean lawsuit. That's the basic crux of the biscuit here, I think, is that Sharp should not be allowed to opt out those restrictions and substitute in U.S. relatively lax U.S. discoverability rules and leave defendants to play by completely different rules, more restrictive rules. It's just inherently prejudicial and unfair to the defendants in the Korean litigation.

I think another important point along those lines is that Sharp has made no effort, I heard nothing from Mr. Searby here to contradict this, has made no effort to proceed under those rules to even try to gain discovery, to say it's impossible, but I haven't seen -- they haven't made an effort at an application.

Mr. Searby makes the point that they have a strong need for documents, but defendants also have a need for documents, and I don't think it's any answer to say that, Well, Sharp will make available to defendants in the Korean litigation the same documents that defendants produced here. Those aren't the documents we need. Frankly, what we need is to be able to take

With respect to the KFTC report that we attached to our declaration, I hear Mr. Searby criticizing us because we didn't provide -- provided an insufficient roadmap for him to take discovery in Korea. I don't think it's our job, frankly, to provide him with a sufficient roadmap to take Korean discovery. I think our point in providing that and making the suggestions that we did in our reply brief is that there is a lot of public information that's out there about the documents. There are a lot of documents that have actually been made public in this lawsuit and elsewhere and Sharp can avail themselves of those public materials if they feel, if they say they don't have information about particular documents to make an application. And I think that that's the proper first step for Sharp to make here is to make some effort to proceed and take discovery under Korean rules.

With respect to the comments from the Korean court about acknowledging their U.S. efforts, I think your Honor was trenchant in your insight about that it doesn't really speak to whether the Court would be receptive or not. And if your Honor is inclined to give any credence at all, I would ask you to take a look at the decision in the Digitechnic case that we cited in our briefs.

In that case, the applicant made a very similar statement or re-laid a very similar statement that they said that they had told the French court in that case that they were

- Documen Page 54 1 going to conduct U.S. discovery and the French court expressed 1 is one of the ones that talks about the danger of swamping a 2 great interest in that discovery and the Court gave that no 2 foreign court with unwanted discovery. And Judge Posner says 3 3 credence at all for the same reasons that your Honor expressed. it's not a real danger there because the courts can control and 4 To counsel's point about there being -- with respect to 4 just refuse to admit whatever documents it doesn't want. I 5 the difference sets of defendants here, it is the case that they 5 don't know that the Korean court has the same control here. In 6 6 are not completely overlapping. There are defendants in the fact, Sharp has said in its papers that there are very lax rules 7 Korean litigation that are not present in the U.S. litigation. 7 of admissibility in Korea. So I think that's a particularly 8 So just to try to clarify that point. 8 acute problem and a pitfall that's particularly present here in 9 9 On the point about whether the Korean court would be this case that wasn't in Kulzer. 10 receptive to this discovery or not, I think I heard Mr. Searby 10 Just let me take a look at my notes. 11 11 trying to reverse the burden there. We cited several cases in The final point I'd make, your Honor, is that our 12 our papers from within the Ninth Circuit from District Courts 12 confidentiality issues here are real. I don't know that we 13 saying that on that point in particular, if there's silence that 13 could resolve the protective order issues now and I haven't read 14 14 actually either works against the applicant or the Courts find a real proposal for resolving them yet, but I would caution -- I 15 would say that we shouldn't be -it's basically a neutral factor. So I will admit that there are 15 16 cases that go either way on that point with regards to the 16 HON. LEGGE: Well, what do you have here? Is it a 17 17 burden, who bears the burden of showing that the court, the blanket confidentiality order that's been entered or do you have 18 foreign court would be receptive, but I think the Wade authority 18 a lot of documents filed under seal or what's the source of the 19 inside the Ninth Circuit is that that lies with the applicant. 19 confidentiality protection that the parties now have in this 20 20 Let me talk for a minute about this Kulzer case that case in the United States? 21 21 MR. CUNNINGHAM: There is a protective order in the counsel has talked about a couple of times in the Seventh 22 Circuit. It's an interesting case because the way the opinion 22 United States. It says that the documents produced here were 23 23 was laid out, at the start of the opinion Judge Posner talks produced only for use in the this U.S. CRT MDL. It provides for 24 about 1782 discovery generally and lays out several pitfalls 24 the producing party to label the documents either confidential 25 that could -- lied in the path of the District Court as they're 25 or highly confidential. In reliance on that order, the parties Page 55 Page 57 1 considering a 1782 application. And he goes on to explain why 1 produce documents and gave them the appropriate label. And as I 2 2 those pitfalls aren't present in that particular case, but I expressed in my opening remarks, we're just concerned that 3 3 confidentiality can't be maintained if these documents were think they are present in this case. 4 So basically that case had to do with German litigation 4 brought into Korea. 5 between two competitors and it was trade secrets litigation and 5 MR. TALADAY: Your Honor, may I add something from that 6 it was two companies that made bone cement and one company 6 point? 7 7 sought discovery of the other in the U.S. and with a very narrow HON. LEGGE: Yeah. Let me finish up with the parties 8 8 first and I'll ask the other counsel present if they want to add subpoena, seeking a very narrow range of documents having to do 9 with correspondence between one company and another with respect 9 10 to that particular bone cement formula. So there's the first 10 Mr. Searby, one question just occurred to me. In the 11 U.S. litigation, did Sharp opt out of the direct purchaser difference between the two cases, that's a much more narrow 11 12 request. I won't go through all the facts, but the Court laid 12 class? 13 out the pitfalls, as I said, that I think are present here. 13 MR. SEARBY: Yes, your Honor. 14 14 HON. LEGGE: And did you also opt out of the indirect One, the Court recognized this danger of unfairness that we have 15 15 purchaser class? here where one party gets a trove of documents from the United 16 States and brings them back and the another party doesn't have 16 MR. SEARBY: I'm not as clear about the indirect 17 17 the same discovery opportunity. I think that's present here. purchaser class question you pose. I tend to doubt it, but I do 18 18 The court in Kulzer said it wasn't present there. The Court in know that we opted out of the direct purchaser class and --19 Kulzer also noted that the applicant had no opportunity to get 19 MR. TALADAY: Can I clarify that? 20 the same discovery in Germany, but I think that's shown here 20 HON. LEGGE: Counsel here thinks he has an answer. 21 21 MR. TALADAY: So neither the direct purchaser or the that there is an opportunity to get some documents at least in 22

indirect purchaser class has been certified. That's coming up

MR. TALADAY: There have been two settlements that have

for your Honor's consideration.

HON. LEGGE: Yes, I understand.

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Korea, it's just that Sharp hasn't availed themselves of that

opportunity. Another pitfall identified by the Kulzer Court

that I think is present here is that the foreign court might get

more documents than it actually wants. Judge Posner's opinion

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moved forward for the direct purchaser class. I'm unaware that the indirect purchaser class has moved any settlements forward.

MR. SAVERI: Rick Saveri, if I may, your Honor.

in that position.

Sharp has opted out of the two settlements, and that declaration was filed and that was before your Honor this morning. Sharp has chosen not to be before us and in this venue. So I'm going to hold on. I wanted to make two points.

8 This was one of them, your Honor. I'll hold off on that though.

HON. LEGGE: Mr. Rushing, you want to add anything?
 MR. RUSHING: I just have one quick one, your Honor. I
 would just -- briefly going back to the burden question.

would just -- briefly going back to the burden question.

Mr. Searby is just wrong, as I explained earlier, to
assert that there's no burden on Saveri at all. Obviously as
our declaration reflected, we would attempt to minimize the
burden to us but that it would not be possible for us to do that
completely. And I think Mr. Searby -- I mean, his argument
essentially treats Saveri as you would treat a vendor, and
that's our point. I don't think Mr. Searby's attitude is
surprising either. I think it's typical and it would be typical
of the attitude of the attorneys for every other plaintiff and
every other foreign jurisdiction right now. And that, you know,

if this motion is granted and if Saveri becomes -- has to

produce these documents, it will be one-stop shopping for these

cases, the Saveri firm, and we just submit that we should not be

here and then be subject to the Court's order on how that discovery procedure conducts itself, as Mr. Rushing outlined.

So just briefly, your Honor, they have taken steps not to be in this jurisdiction and therefore I do not feel they should have the benefit of the discovery here.

The second point and as was stated by Mr. Searby, we did meet and confer and it was patently clear they have no interest in any of the plaintiff's documents, your Honor. They don't want any of the plaintiff's documents, any of the plaintiff's depositions. They want the defendants' documents. They want Samsung's documents. They want me to turn over Samsung's documents. So that's why we say the subpoena is just on the wrong party. If I want Samsung documents, I go to Samsung, your Honor. And I feel if Sharp wishes to get the defendants' documents, they should put the subpoena on one of the defendants, all of the defendants, and get the documents. They have a complete set of all the same defendant documents that I have, your Honor.

So I really feel that the subpoena is directed at the wrong party. They don't want any of our documents. They wish to have Samsung's, the Philips, the Hitachi, the Toshiba documents, and they should go to those parties for those documents, your Honor. That's all. Thank you, your Honor.

HON. LEGGE: All right. Do any other counsel present wish to comment?

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Secondly, Mr. Searby's point that this happens all the time with third-party direct-action plaintiffs, it does, but if you -- the order in this case, we have an order which your Honor entered regarding that very procedure, it's document number 1128 filed on April 3rd, 2012, order re discovery and case management protocol. Paragraph F of that order provides that it's the defendants, it's not the Saveri firm, it's the defendants who are to provide the direct-action folks with the documents. Again, this notion that it would be Saveri or the plaintiffs who are obligated to bring these folks up to speed is not correct.

Mr. Searby made a point about delay, but, again, that's not a reason to require Saveri to do anything there. If they subpoenaed to wrong person, they subpoenaed the wrong person. That's their problem.

HON. LEGGE: Mr. Saveri, you wanted to add something?

MR. SAVERI: Just briefly, your Honor. Two points. I
find it sort of fundamentally unfair that a company takes
affirmative steps not to be here. They have opted out of the
direct purchaser case and filed in Korea. They've done
affirmative steps not to be in this District Court. They've
taken -- they do not wish to be here. Now after they filed
their case in Korea, has said, Oops, we now want all the

benefits of the U.S. discovery, and I think that's just
fundamentally unfair, your Honor. If they wished to be here and
take the benefits of the U.S. discovery, they should file a case

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MR. TALADAY: Yes, your Honor, if I could.
 MR. SEARBY: Your Honor. I'm sorry, your Honor. This
 is Bruce Searby on the telephone. I would like to respond to a
 couple of remarks.

HON. LEGGE: Well, I will give you that chance. I'll give you the opportunity to close here, but I'm just asking whether the other defense counsel who have been attending the hearing wish to make a comment.

MR. TALADAY: Your Honor, John Taladay on behalf of Philips. I'll make a few comments to clarify some factual misperceptions which apply to Philips as well as some of the other defendants. If I misstate them, they can certainly clarify.

Your Honor, we are a moving party here. We've joined in this motion to quash. If you look at footnote one of the motion, you'll see that we have, all of defendants present have and I believe every defendant in the case has, so we certainly endorse the arguments that Mr. Cunningham has made.

Secondly, your Honor, Philips and Philips entities are not a party to the litigation in Korea. None of our subsidiaries are parties to the litigation in Korea. Mr. Searby mentioned LG/Philips displays, which was a joint venture formed in 2001 in which Philips and LG were shareholders. We disposed of our last share, remaining shares in that entity in 2006 and have had no relationship to that entity prior even as a

Page 62 1 1 I've got to get a citation. So where are you reading from that shareholder. So we are not a party to that case. 2 That has one implication I would mention, your Honor, 2 I can copy the citation? 3 with respect to the protective order. If your Honor concludes 3 MR. SEARBY: Page 3 of the reply brief of the 4 to allow the subpoena, we would urge you not to, we would be in 4 defendants. 5 a position as a nonparty to that case. I don't know who the 5 HON. LEGGE: Reply brief of defendants? 6 6 defendants are. I don't know who the parties are in that case. MR. SEARBY: That's correct. That's document 18. In 7 I have no means of monitoring what happens to our documents set 7 any event, it's filed on September 17th, just a few days ago. 8 in that case. I have no means of knowing whether the parties 8 HON. LEGGE: I'm sorry. Give me a moment to get my 9 9 who might sign that protective order are subject to the hands on it. Here it is. jurisdiction of this court, which means I have no idea whether I 10 10 Where am I looking? 11 have a remedy if the protective order is violated. So should 11 MR. SEARBY: You're looking at page 3 in the middle of 12 you conclude that it's proper to proceed with the subpoena, we 12 the page it says: Within the Ninth Circuit, however, courts 13 would at least reserve, your Honor, on whether we are proper 13 have generally placed the burden on the requesting party to 14 14 parties for whom to produce documents. provide facts showing that the foreign court would welcome the 15 And if I can be permitted one observation on the merits, 15 proposed discovery. That is just a real stretch of those cases. 16 your Honor. 16 These cases are, first of all, unpublished District Court cases. 17 HON. LEGGE: Yes. 17 They do not purport to analyze and discuss and formulate any 18 MR. TALADAY: If I have heard Mr. Searby properly, and 18 rule, any burden rule. What you see in them, your Honor, is the 19 he'll correct me if I haven't, Sharp has never actually formally 19 issue of receptivity coming up, assertions by the applicant 20 20 requested documents before the Korean court. I believe about the receptiveness of the Court, and that basically either 21 21 Mr. Searby said that Sharp's Korean counsel opined that the being too weak or too unsubstantiated in that Court's opinion to 22 Korean court would not produce the documents; I think in the 22 outweigh all the other factors in those cases that weighed in 23 23 record you'll find the words it would be a probably futile favor of denying the application. This is really not a, quote, 24 effort, and I would find it, your Honor, a question of some 24 unquote, test. There's no Intel test as defendants say in their 25 concern if United States courts were to become the court of 25 reply brief, a test where you have to meet each element. This Page 63 Page 65 1 1 first instance for seeking discovery in foreign proceedings when isn't what's going on with the Intel case. It's a 2 the foreign procedure had not even been attempted. 2 non-exhaustive list of discretionary factors for the Court to 3 3 HON. LEGGE: Okay. Any other counsel wish to be heard? consider and many of them are sort of interrelated, and 4 4 MS. MAYO: Your Honor, on behalf of LG, we agree with essentially what you see in the cases is a discussion of all 5 Mr. Taladay's arguments on behalf of Philips and point out that 5 these factors and the Court kind of coming out one way or 6 we were also in that joint venture. LGE is not in the 6 another based upon a very loose balancing process of 7 7 litigation in Korea. discretionary factors. 8 HON. LEGGE: You parties need not just adopt what others 8 And so in the Peter Damien Marano case, you have serious 9 have said. I assume that counsel for defense has been speaking 9 relevant problems about what the applicant had asked for and how 10 on behalf of everybody. So unless there's something to add, I 10 it would be possibly relevant to the foreign proceeding. You 11 11 think we should conclude your participation. Thank you. have very serious burden and overbreadth problems regarding 40 12 Mr. Searby, you wish to conclude, sir. 12 different sets of documents, and these are factors that are 13 MR. SEARBY: Yes, your Honor. 13 driving the court towards not wanting to grant the application. 14 I think that most of the remarks of counsel I've already 14 And then there's a conclusory statement by the applicant that 15 15 addressed in mind. There are a couple of things particularly this is no attempt to circumvent British law and the Court 16 relating to some of the cases. Digitechnic I want to talk 16 doesn't buy it. It doesn't help. It doesn't outweigh the other 17 about. The Digitechnic case is a more general proposition 17 things that are going on in the case. For the defendants then 18 offered by counsel that in the Ninth Circuit the applicant has a 18 to say, Well, this establishes some sort of Ninth Circuit 19 burden of proof on the receptivity factor that the foreign court 19 burden, it's a real misreading of these unpublished District 20 will receive the evidence. That is really not a fair reading of 20 Court decisions. And I ask your Honor to read that and the 21 21 these cases, your Honor, and I urge you to read the cases In Re Digitechnic case cited by counsel to understand that point. 22 22 Application of Peter Damien Marano. However, Digitechnic --Digitechnic is a case that turned on delay, crazy delay 23 23 page 3 of the brief -- of the reply brief of the defendants. If by the applicant there. And nothing remotely what we have here 24 you read those cases, you'll find out that again --24 in this case and the Court reacted very poorly to that and the 25 HON. LEGGE: Wait a minute. Before I can read them, 25 applicant could not overcome the problems with his application

Page 66 1 with an assertion that the foreign court has expressed interest counsel and with witnesses, opposing counsel, whoever, to ensure 1 2 in receiving the evidence. It didn't do it for the Court there, 2 that these documents' confidentiality is maintained, and we can 3 which saw big problems with granting that application. 3 work that out. There's no reason, as counsel suggested, to 4 Essentially it felt like it was not a proper use of the Court's 4 think we can't. 5 time to come to the rescue of this party that had engaged in 5 Thank you, your Honor. 6 6 HON. LEGGE: All right. Thank you, Mr. Searby, and such incredible delay. 7 And, finally, the Intel case. It's stands for the 7 thank you to counsel present. I think it was an excellent 8 proposition, your Honor, which is pivotal to this case here. 8 presentation. I'm not going to be making any ruling at this 9 9 That if one tribunal's discovery limits do not necessarily time. I feel I must go back and do quite a bit of reading. So 10 signal objection to aid from the United States Federal Courts in 10 the matter, the motion, both motions, I should say, more 11 11 specifically the defendants' motion to quash the subpoena and that a foreign tribunal's reluctance to order production of 12 12 Sharp's motion to compel are taken under submission as of today. materials has no necessary correlation with a resistance to 13 receiving and considering evidence gathered here pursuant to 13 So thank you all very much and we will be off the record 14 14 1782, and that's the Intel case. at this time. 15 15 So I wanted to point out those facts about the case law (Proceedings concluded at 4:10 p.m.) 16 and then I want to quickly respond to Mr. Saveri's point about 16 17 17 how Sharp has opted out and does not wish to be in the Northern 18 District of California in that litigation. 18 19 19 Well, you know, Sharp has opted out. The entire point 20 of opting out is to maintain the possibility of filing your own 20 21 lawsuit as a direct purchaser. Sharp hasn't done that yet, but 21 22 the entire point of writing an opt-out declaration or letter is 22 23 precisely to preserve your ability to be there with you all in 23 24 the CRT case as a direct purchaser plaintiff. So it's really 24 25 neither here nor there. You know, if we opt out and we don't 25 Page 67 1 file any cases or we do, it doesn't really matter because what 1 2 STATE OF CALIFORNIA 2 we're here about on this hearing is Korea. It's about a 3 different volume of commerce that doesn't touch the United 3 COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO) 4 States and it's about a case that we really did file in 2010, 4 5 that it needs evidence to go forward and the Court there is 5 I, Ruby Sanchez, a Certified Shorthand Reporter, do 6 waiting for evidence to go forward. That's what this is about 6 hereby certify: 7 and we cannot go forward without evidence. We need the evidence 7 That said proceedings were taken before me at the 8 here because we cannot at the moment pursue it there and all of 8 time and place therein set forth and were taken down by me in 9 the defendants' ideas about how we should go about doing that, 9 shorthand and thereafter reduced to computerized transcription 10 basically fall flat and they're not real, they're not real 10 under my direction and supervision; 11 genuine options for my client. 11 I further certify that I am neither counsel for, nor 12 So the defendants and Mr. Saveri are going to have us do related to, any party to said proceedings, nor in any way 12 13 a runaround trying to do anything but lay our hands on what is 13 interested in the outcome thereof. 14 14 In witness whereof, I have hereunto subscribed my already sitting there, and this can go on for a very long time 15 15 name. or your Honor can recognize that we meet all the statutory 16 16 requirements and that there is no basis for quashing the 17 Dated: October 3, 2012 17 subpoena in the Intel factors and be done with this rather than 18 18 sending us traipsing in after all the different coconspirators 19 19 who participated in the glass meetings with separate 20 20 applications. That is not an efficient use of this Court's time Ruby Sanchez 21 or anyone else's. 21 CSR No. 12971, RPR 22 Again, if your Honor wants to talk about the protective 22 23 order, I'm happy to explain in detail how we have charted a 23 24 course for protecting those confidentiality interests. Paul 24 25 Weiss is committed to working with our client and with Korean 25

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